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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the court below properly instruct the jury on the 
measure of damages? 
2. Was the verdict supported by substantial evidence and 
application of the law? 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. During 1984, the State of Utah entered into negoti-
ations with plaintiffs to acquire a strip of property along the 
frontage of the Carpet Barn for a highway widening project. 
(T-14.) 
2. Plaintiffs refused the State's offer to purchase the 
strip of property and the road widening plans were altered to 
go around plaintiffs' property. (T-20, T-74.) 
3. The Carpet Barn structure was constructed 20 feet from 
the State's right-of-way line and 38 feet from the traveled 
way. (T-114; 275.) 
4. Patrons of the Carpet Barn used the State's right-of-
way to maneuver their vehicles for parking in front of the busi-
ness, prior to the construction project. (T-44-45; 48.) 
5. As part of the road widening project the State con-
structed a retaining wall across the front of plaintiffs' 
property along the right-of-way boundary where the property 
began to slope down to the Carpet Barn structures. (T-15.) 
6. The wall was topped by a chain link fence which was 
subsequently removed. (T-36.) 
7. When the construction project was completed it was 
discovered that the footings encroached on plaintiffs' property 
approximately 6 inches. (T-292.) 
8. The plaintiffs1 southern property boundary was 20 feet 
from the building structure allowing for a 20 foot wide drive-
way which ran from Redwood Road to the rear of the structure. 
(T-7; 281.) 
9. The access to plaintiffs' property was unreasonable 
both before the construction project and after its completion. 
(T-234-235.) 
10. At the completion of the project/ parallel parking 
spaces were in place along the frontage of the Carpet Barn 
property (T. 52). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury was properly instructed on the measure of sever-
ance damages, i.e., the value of the remaining property before 
the taking minus the value of the remaining property after the 
taking. The jury properly applied those instructions to the 
evidence offered by the State's engineer and the State's 
appraiser. 
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Plaintiffs1 "theory of the case" was adequately presented 
by the instructions when read and considered as a whole and by 
the evidence offered by plaintiffs and defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 




THE JURY CORRECTLY FOLLOWED THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 
COURT WITH REGARD TO CALCULATION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES 
AND THEIR VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED. 
The jury considered and applied the parameters set forth in 
Instruction No. 15 in calculating severance damages. The 
instruction required consideration of the value of the remain-
ing property before the severance of the part acquired and the 
value of the remaining property after severance. The figures 
ultimately returned by the jury included the value of the land 
taken, the value attributable to the construction easement, and 
an amount representing severance damages to the remaining 
property. (T-292.) 
Defendant's appraiser testified that the value of the pro-
perty (which included land and buildings) prior to the taking 
was $306,000.00, based on a combination of the market, cost and 
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income approaches. (T-271 to 292.) He further testified that 
the property had suffered a depreciation, not from physical 
deterioration, but from functional obsolescence which he 
explained to be problems inherent in the building as originally 
constructed. (T-280 to 281.) He applied a penalty or set-off 
for aspects existing in the structure which would not be built 
into a new structure. The functional obsolescence already 
existed prior to the taking. (T-293.) The value of the 
property was therefore the same both before and after the 
taking. (T-280.) 
Two of the three buildings which comprised the structure on 
the Carpet Barn property were constructed in the early 1950*s 
for the purpose of manufacturing munitions. (T-278.) The 
highest and best use at the time of construction was manufac-
turing. (T-282.) The highest and best use currently is 
qualified commercial or warehouse commercial, as distinguished 
from typical retail commercial property. (T-272 to 278.) 
The buildings were constructed 20 feet from the south 
boundary of the property, allowing a 20 foot drive for access 
to the rear of the buildings. The 20 foot access would have 
been easy to close off and control and may have been so limited 
at the time of construction for security reasons. (T-281.) 
The buildings were constructed 20 feet from the west 
boundary of the property (the right-of-way line) and 38 feet 
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from the traveled way. (T-275.) When the property was con-
verted from manufacturing use to commercial use, the owner was 
faced with the problem of parking because "commercial use 
doesn't generally exist with parking solely in the rear." 
(T-282.) The problem was resolved at the time by simply using 
the State's right of way for parking and access or, in effect, 
"borrowing" the parking in the front. (T-282.) When the State 
elected to use its full right-of-way, the problem did not 
change. It was inherent in the property when its use changed 
from manufacturing to commercial. The State did not create the 
problem, but at the time it elected to utilize its existing 
right-of-way, the functional obsolescence which had previously 
existed since the time the use had changed from manufacturing 
to commercial became operational. (T-292 to 293.) 
As testified by defendant's appraiser, the functional 
obsolescence was not caused by the "taking", but was caused by 
the change from manufacturing to commercial use. Therefore, 
the actual value of the property was the same before the 
"taking" as it was after the "taking." (T-280.) 
Defendant's appraiser considered the fact that after the 
State used its right-of-way and plaintiffs could no longer use 
the State's property, the unusable strip of land in front of 
the buildings which had previously been used for parking, 
should be "cleaned up" and could be used more aesthetically by 
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undergoing some landscaping which he valued at $4,543.00. 
(T-293 to 294.) He reasoned that when plaintiffs could no 
longer borrow the State's property to provide parking, the best 
use of the remaining strip belonging to plaintiffs would be to 
improve the face of the building. When the retaining wall was 
constructed there remained a "kind of hole" in front of the 
building which Mr. Lang did not feel was desirable from a 
retail standpoint. He felt that the landscaping should be done 
to clean up the effects of the construction and to put the 
unusable strip of property to some useful purpose, which in his 
opinion would increase the value of the entire remaining pro-
perty to at least what it had been prior to the "taking." 
(T-333 to 334.) He therefore determined that the difference in 
value of the remaining property before the "taking" and after 
the "taking" was $4,543.00 or the cost of making the unusable 
strip of land functional again. (T-324.) 
Plaintiffs suggest that the entire basis for Mr, Lang's 
conclusion was a hearsay statement made by Mr. Beaufort, 
another State expert, which was later contradicted in Court. 
The statement pertained to the access enjoyed by plaintiffs 
prior to the State's utilization of the right-of-way and was 
taken completely out of context when quoted in plaintiffs' 
brief. Mr. Beaufort's testimony at trial was not inconsistent 
with the out-of-court statement relied upon by Mr. Lang. 
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Mr. Lang testified that one of the factors he considered in his 
analysis was a statement made by Mr. Beaufort that plaintiffs 
did not have access across the frontage of the property prior 
to the taking. (T-315.) In response to both direct exami-
nation and cross-examination, Mr. Beaufort stated that the 
"access" to the Carpet Barn property was unreasonable both 
before the "taking" (T-234) and after the "taking" (T-235). 
His opinion that the access before the taking was unreasonable 
is explained as follows: 
A. I base that upon the only access to the property; 
the property in general that I would recognize as an 
access, was the 20 foot driveway, a 20 foot driveway 
that will operate for commercial use and industrial 
use; i.e., trucks and cars at the same time, 20 foot 
wide access is inadequate. 
(T-234.) When asked whether he was aware that customer parking 
was available in front of the Carpet Barn complex prior to com-
pletion of the project, Mr. Beaufort responded that he was 
aware that vehicles were utilizing the frontage and the right-
of-way in front of the building, and that he considered that 
fact in arriving at his opinion. (T-235.) 
Even though Mr. Beaufort was aware of the 200 foot frontage 
distance at the property prior to the taking, he did not con-
sider that to be "access," and stated that despite that aware-
ness "there was no improved access or control of access . . . . 
(T-253 to 254.) It became apparent on cross-examination that 
Mr. Beaufort's definition of the term access differed from that 
of plaintiffs1 counsel: 
Q. Perhaps we ought to maybe define some terms. 
When I use the term "access" — and I'm not an 
engineer, sir — what I'm saying is: Were you made 
aware of the fact that for a substantial number of 
years, in fact, 1972 until 1985, that customers of the 
Carpet Barn drove from Redwood Road on to the Carpet 
Barn property and parked in front? 
A. Yes, I was aware that they were parking and 
maneuvering on the right-of-way. 
Q. That's what I mean when I say "access." In other 
words, you can go from point A to point B along a 200 
foot frontage piece of property, correct? 
A. You're saying a 200 foot driveway? 
Q. Right, exactly. Now, you say that you were aware 
of that? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Sessions went on to discuss whether the area was traver-
sible and Mr. Beaufort's testimony in that regard was partially 
quoted in Plaintiffs' brief. It's full context is as follows: 
Q. Do you know of any law, any regulation, any 
directive, that says that a customer of the Carpet 
Barn parking in 20 feet of property can't back out 
onto Redwood Road and proceed North or South over the 
State's right-of-way? 
A. If its transversible [sic], I believe there is — 
there is transversible [sic]. There is no law that 
says you cannot do that. In the State Regulations, to 
my understanding, that right-of-way cannot be used for 
parking and maneuvering of vehicles. The landowner — 
that information is available to the landowner. But 
if it's transversible [sic], then I'm sure that vehi-
cles would utilize it. 
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Mr. Beaufort conceded that if the property were traver-
sible, vehicles would utilize it. He did not concede that the 
200 foot frontage provided legal access, improved access, or 
control of access and clearly distinguished between use of the 
property and legal "access" or improved "access" to the 
property. 
Mr. Lang also qualified his testimony by stating: 
A. I don't know whether the State had the right to 
control access there or not. I'm not an expert in 
these things. I appraised this property the way it 
is. (Emphasis added.) 
(T-315.) Mr. Lang was clearly referring to a legal right to 
access and not actual physical use of the right of way. He 
Stated several times that the plaintiffs borrowed public 
property for access to their parking (T-282) and that he did 
not know what they were entitled to in the law. (T-324.) His 
calculations were based on what they had before and what they 
had after (T-325), which was a problem that always existed; 
when parking was constricted from the time the property became 
retail. (T-325.) 
The New Mexico Supreme Court in City of Albuquerque v-
Chapman, 76 N.M. 162, 413 P.2d 204 (1966) stated: 
[O]pinion by real estate appraisers on "before and 
after" market values must be considered in connection 
with related facts on which they are based, and a 
satisfactory explanation must be given as to how the 
witness arrived at his conclusion. 
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Id. at 208 (citing Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Ptak, 236 
Ark. 105, 364 S.W.2d 794 (1963)). In Chapman, supra, it was 
determined that the appraiser's testimony was based entirely on 
inaccurate dimensions and mathematical calculations as well as 
undeveloped reasoning. In this case both the State's appraiser 
and the State's engineer gave satisfactory explanations of the 
facts on which they relied and the bases of their calculations. 
Each expert testified that his opinions and calculations were 
based on what access the plaintiffs had before the taking and 
what they had after the taking. It should not be overlooked in 
the context of this discussion that plaintiffs' experts offered 
their own opinions on the issue of reasonableness of access to 
the property before and after the taking. (T-103.) Rebuttal 
and further argument were also available regarding the weight 
to be given such testimony. 
The jury apparently agreed with the State's experts that 
although the property was traversible before the taking, plain-
tiffs did not have improved access or control of access before 
the taking and therefore there was no unreasonable interfer-
ence, impairment or restriction of plaintiffs' right of access 
when the frontage strip could no longer be used for parking. 
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II 
THE JURY RELIED ON THE APPROPRIATE MEASURE 
OF DAMAGES AND THE STATE'S ESTIMATE OF 
DAMAGES WAS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The testimony of defendant's appraiser was based on a 
calculation of value prior to the taking minus the value after 
the taking, and was not based on a "cost to cure" analysis. 
Mr. Lang did discuss the cost to cure a functional obsolescence 
existing in the property prior to the taking in addressing one 
possible option to provide additional parking. However, the 
jury award did not include that figure and he did not testify 
that the cost to cure that functional obsolescence affected his 
calculation of the difference in value before and after the 
taking for the purposes of an award of severance damages. 
(T-325 to 327; 332 to 333.) Mr. Lang testified that the 
property had been devalued by the existence of the functional 
obsolescence prior to the taking. (T-280 to 281; 293.) 
Plaintiffs argue that the verdict in this case is contrary 
to Utah law and cite Utah Dep't of Transportation v. Rayco 
Corp., 599 P.2d 481 (Utah 1979), stating that testimony offered 
by the State in this case is nearly identical to that rejected 
by this Court in Rayco. 
In Rayco, supra, the State's estimate of severance damages, 
which was based on the cost of acquiring additional land and 
using that land for parking (cost to cure) was adopted by the 
jury. This Court held that "the proper measure of severance 
damages to the remainder is the difference between the fair 
cash market value before and after the taking." Id. at 489 
(citing State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 321, 366 P.2d 76 
(1961)). 
In this case the jury verdict was not based on a compro-
mised cost to cure the plaintiffs* parking problem. All of the 
testimony offered with regard to cost to cure the parking 
problem was simply incidental testimony of calculations and 
alternatives to cure the pre-existing functional obsolescence 
and related to resolution of the parking problem. The testi-
mony offered regarding landscaping had nothing to do with 
curing the parking problem but was offered as a direct alter-
native to increasing the value of the unusable parking strip to 
something useful. 
In awarding $4,543.00 as severance damages, the jury 
adopted the opinion of defendant's expert that the value of the 
property had decreased by that amount when plaintiffs no longer 
had the benefit of the use of public property for their parking 
and an alternative for making the then unusable strip of land 
of some use and value would be to landscape it at a cost of 
$4,543.00. Mr. Lang did not consider that amount to be an 
improvement cost, but the cost to reestablish that strip of 
property to some useful purpose and to "clean up" after the 
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construction project. Mr. Lang testified that "$5,425.00 is 
the difference between what he had before and what he has now 
in my opinion." (T-324.) 
The testimony offered by the State regarding remedying the 
parking situation was with regard to curing the preexisting 
functional obsolescence and was not intended as an alternative 
"cure" for the taking. The State did not attempt to introduce 
"cost to cure" evidence as a measure of severance damages for 
the taking and the jury did not adopt the "cost to cure" the 
parking problem as a measure of severance damages. Mr. Lang 
attempted to clarify this in response to a question posed by 
plaintiffs' counsel: 
A. I think you are mixing up cost to cure damages 
with curable functional obsolescence. And curable 
functional obsolescence relates to the value of the 
property, specifically the value of the buildings. 
And that occurred when the use changed from manu-
facturing to retail. 
Curable functional obsolescence is what I'm 
talking about here. I am saying whoever bought the 
property and used it for retail had a parking pro-
blem. At any time they knew the State could do what 
it's done. So they had to solve the problem somehow. 
I would say and have said that an informed buyer would 
have made a deduction for that fact when he bought the 
property. I don't know if they did. I assume they 
did. 
(T-332, 333.) The "cost to cure" testimony related only to 
curing the preexisting functional obsolescence and not to the 
value of the property. 
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By awarding the cost of landscaping as severance damages, 
plaintiffs were put in as good a financial position as they 
were in before the taking in terms of the property they owned 
and were legally entitled to use. Plaintiffs are merely 
disappointed that the jury did not adopt the estimate of 
severance damages advocated by their appraiser, 
III 
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE LAW. 
The evidence presented during the course of the trial, 
together with the instructions given by the Court, adequately 
addressed the plaintiffs' theory of the case and the appro-
priate measure of damages. 
Plaintiffs object to the failure of the Court to give 
plaintiffs1 proposed Instruction No. 26: 
You are instructed that the evidence in this case is 
that the State of Utah did not attempt, in any way, to 
restrict highway access of the Carpet Barn property 
until August, 1985. 
The basis of the objection was that the instruction was 
necessary to give the jury a starting point to calculate 
severance damages. The calculation of severance damages, 
however, requires a determination of the value of the property 
before the taking as compared to the value after the taking, 
and plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how proposed 
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Instruction No. 26 would have been relevant to their apprai-
ser's determination of the value of the property before and 
after the taking. Likewise, whether the State ever attempted 
to utilize its right of way prior to the date of the actual 
taking is not relevant or significant to the calculation of 
severance damages. There was ample evidence presented 
regarding the dates of construction and the configuration of 
the property before and after the taking. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs" proposed Instruction No. 26 was 
not necessary to the utilization of other instructions or the 
calculation of severance damages. This is amply demonstrated 
by the multiple references to the prohibition against unreason-
able interference, impairment or restriction of right of access 
in the instructions given, including Nos. 18, 20, and 21. As 
plaintiffs recognize and state in their brief, jury 
instructions must be read and considered as whole. 
Plaintiffs also object to the elimination of language from 
their proffered Instruction Nos. 25 and 28. Both of those 
instructions eliminated the language "established by long-term 
use or travel" in discussing rights of ingress and egress. 
Plaintiffs relied on § 27-12-134, Utah Code Ann., in formulat-
ing the instructions proffered. That statute states: 
27-12-134, Authorities may regulate, require permit 
and security for excavation or construction -
Limitation on authority. 
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Except as otherwise provided in section 54-4-15, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the highway authorities of 
the state, counties, cities, and towns are authorized 
to adopt regulations, and may require a permit contain-
ing reasonable terms and conditions, for the crossing, 
digging-up, or the placement, construction, and mainte-
nance of approach roads, driveways, structures, poles, 
pipelines, conduits, sewers, ditches, culverts, facili-
ties, or any other structures or objects of any kind 
or character on the public highway rights-of-way under 
their respective jurisdiction. Said highway author-
ities may require a surety bond or other reasonable 
security which may be forfeited in the event the 
regulations or the conditions of a permit are breached. 
The authority granted by this section shall not 
be exercised so as to deny reasonable ingress and 
egress to property adjoining a public highway except 
where said highway authorities have acquired such 
right of ingress and egress by gift, agreement, pur-
chase, eminent domain, or otherwise or where no right 
of ingress or egress exists between the right-of-way 
and the adjoining property. 
That statute does not contain the language eliminated from the 
instruction by the Court, and the elimination was therefore 
appropriate. 
The instructions, when read as a whole, adequately reflect 
plaintiffs1 theory of the case as well as the state of the law. 
IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE 
OF THE CHAIN LINK FENCE AND EVIDENCE OF 
ACCESS ALLOWED OTHER PROPERTIES. 
As plaintiffs have indicated, they are entitled to 
introduce evidence of the value of the property at its highest 
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and best use as of the date of the taking and did so at trial 
through the testimony of their own experts. 
Defendant is also entitled to introduce evidence of the 
value of the property at its highest and best use as of the 
date of the taking. According to defendant's appraiser, the 
highest and best use at the date of the taking was not for 
commercial property as alleged by the plaintiffs, but for 
qualified commercial property or warehouse commercial 
property. (T-277.) That opinion was based on the fact that 
the property had only a 20 foot drive on its south side and in 
order to provide parking at the front of the building as 
required for a highest and best use of commercial status, the 
plaintiffs were required to "borrow" public property. 
As stipulated at the time of trial, and as the instructions 
reflect, the appropriate measure of damages for the taking of 
plaintiffs1 property is the value of the remaining property 
before the taking minus the value of the remaining property 
after the taking. The chain link fence was a temporary obstruc-
tion which was removed after it was erected and prior to the 
time of trial. The trial court correctly determined that such 
evidence was irrelevant in calculating the value of the remain-
ing property prior to the taking as compared to the value of 
the remaining property after the taking. In spite of that 
fact, the testimony adduced by plaintiffs at trial contained 
multiple references to the fence, in the testimony of both Ken 
MacQueen (T-36) and Jack DeMass (T-101-104). That testimony 
also failed to demonstrate how such evidence is relevant to 
valuation of the property as of the date of the taking. 
The Court also properly excluded evidence as to access 
afforded other properties. The issue of reasonable access as 
it impacts on determining the amount of severance damages is 
dependent on the particular facts and circumstances of each 
case. Absent a showing of "complete similarity" the circum-
stances of neighboring properties would be inadmissible. State 
v. Christensen, 371 P.2d 552, 556 (Utah 1962). In the instant 
case, no such showing was made with respect to elevation, 
setbacks, improved structures, depth and width of property, 
etc. As noted above, plaintiffs presented extensive evidence 
on the issue of reasonable access as it affects their 
individual parcel. 
V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR 
A NEW TRIAL. 
In this case, the evidence received by the Court was 
properly applied under the instructions given and justified the 
verdict returned by the jury. The State's expert testified as 
to his opinion regarding the value of the Carpet Barn property 
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and the jury adopted the opinion of the State's expert, 
Mr. Lang testified that the addition of landscaping to the face 
of the Carpet Barn property would bring the property after the 
taking to the same value that it possessed prior to the 
taking. (T-310.) The jury applied that law as to the 
calculation of values to the testimony of Mr. Lang and 
determined that the difference in value could be adequately 
remedied by the landscape improvement which would cost 
$4,543.00. 
A new trial is not warranted except for some basic and 
compelling reason. In Uptown Appliance and Radio Company v. 
Flint, 249 P.2d 826 (Utah 1952), this Court Stated at p. 829: 
Jury trials are a part of the fundamental tenets of 
our judicial system and where, as in this case, a 
litigant has fully, completely and without restraint, 
been permitted to show his full grievance to a jury 
and they have conscientiously and without any showing 
of prejudice or other extraneous influences decided 
the matter, there must be some basic and compelling 
reasons so inherent in the evidence that the trial 
judge would be warranted in placing his judgment as to 
the result to be reached over and above that of the 
jury. 
No such basic and compelling reasons have been established by 
plaintiffs' counsel. In fact, a careful review of the evidence 
shows at most conflicting testimony, the force and effect of 
which it is for the jury to weigh in arriving at a verdict. 
Where conflicting evidence has been presented, if reason-
able minds could have found as the jury did from the evidence 
-19-
before it, that is sufficient to support the verdict. 
Pollesche v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 497 P.2d 236, 238 
(Utah 1972). 
In this case, the conflicting evidence relates to the value 
of plaintiffs' property before and after the "taking" of a 
small portion of their property. Plaintiffs argue that because 
the jury awarded the amount of severance damages to which Mr. 
Lang testified the jury misunderstood and misapplied the law as 
to severance damages. Mr. Lang's testimony with respect to 
landscaping costs as severance damages was received without 
objection and specifically reflected the difference in value of 
the property before and after the "taking", as illustrated on 
Exhibit 49-D, summarizing Mr. Lang's testimony. Merely because 
the jury rejected conflicting testimony is no indication that 
they misapplied the law or were influenced by inadmissible 
evidence. 
In addition, plaintiffs' counsel during closing argument 
invited the jury to award Mr. Lang's proposed figures as 
damages if they did not adopt those proposed by plaintiffs' 




Plaintiff'!, win r ijivon an opportunity to thoroughly litigate 
their claim at the time of trial and to receive the jury's 
decision thereon. The evidence submitted aiui I lo~ instruct ions 
pi opoujideil lo i IIH iury adequately reflected plaintiffs' theory 
iif the case, This Court should not disturb the jury's 
conclusion merely on t he I", if-:; i s that i easoriab 1 *:j m1 rids mi cjhiH 
differ as to the outcome. Plaintiffs have had a full and fair 
opportunity to present all evidence and arguments in support of 
their posit; ion to t he "iury, and the iury veniiot sliould not be 
disturbed. 
The trial Court also appropriately denied plaintiffs'" 
request for an additur, I'he Court, is not empowered to enter-
tain a motion for an additur when the damages are not so 
inadequate as to indicate a disregard nf lhe evidence by the 
•jury. 
The jury's award was well within the testimony and evidence 
presented at trial the ]in y was adequate Iy iny'vuoted, and its 
v erdict snou i d ue dIf i rmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 3j^av of August 19 88. 
SNOW, CHRISTENS EN - • .-
By 





PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSEI 11 ' TRIJCTJONS 
Nos . 2 5 , 2 6 , 2b 
/ 
INSTRUCTION MO. iP 
The State has authority to adopt and enforce regulations 
governing the use of and access to public highway rights of way, 
i n c I u d i n g i' e g-111 a 11 c n s g o v e n I i n g t:he ] o c a t i on,, numb e r an d wi d th o f 
driveways providing access to and from adjoining land, However, 
the State is prohibited by law from exercising this authority in 
a w,iy rhat: .i* ' rres with or impairs an established 
right of ingress and egress r .-* property adjoining a public high-
way . 
Where art owner of adjoining land has rights of ingress and 
egress to a public highway O Qtp^ 1 i-F^fl by l ^ g - ^ ^ g H Q P m» t-rgirol 
and those rights are unrpasunably inpairerl by th*-- adoption cf 
State regulations or the enforcement of those regulations, that 
owner is entitled to just compensation by vsv oi severance 
damages for the i mreasonabl e restrict:] ox i of 1: • ; p-ht of access. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-134 
INSTRUCTION NO. U^ 
You are instructed that the evidence in this case is that 
the State of Utah did not attempt in any way to restrict highway 
access of the Carpet Barn property until August 1985. 
INSTRUCTION MO. Jjp 
""
v
- rights of access, light, and air are easements appurte-
nant me ±ancl
 Qf an abutting owner on a street; they consti-
tute property rights forming part of t:he ownei: I s es tate These 
substantial property rights, although subject to reasonable ect to reasonaoie j 
regu Laiiion „ may not IIH raken away or i impaired bv the State 
A 
without the payment of just compensation. 
Where ir. connection with an actual taking of an abutting 
prope • * « • , ;;t_rt , tl le erection of a permanei it structure 
as a part of a public highway results in the impairment of or 
damage to the abutting property owner's easements of access, 
light -i n * I d i v e4^rtb4-i^e4--by—te«g -time—fcr-+*w4»--e^ --*«-»-r* r h ar 
damage or impairment are relevant factors properly considered in 
determining severance damages• 
Utah State Road Commission 
vs. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 
1974); 
Utah Road Commission vs. 
Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 
P.2d 917 (1963). 
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN 
INSTRUCTION NO. "2. O 
The State has authority to adopt and enforce regulations 
governing the use of and access to piiliil i c highway rights of way, 
including regulations governing the location, number and width of 
driveways providing access * - anc from adjoining land. However, 
the State - ••om exercising this authority in 
a wav that- treasonably interferes with or impairs an established 
righ" *• digress and egress to property adjoi ning a pu bile 
highway. /J9 fi&Cl&# 
Where an owner of adjoining land has rights of ingress and 
egress to a public highway and those ri ghts are unreasoi lably 
Impaired by the adopti on of State regulations or the enforcement 
of those regulations, that owner is entitled to just compensation 
by way of severance damages for the unreasoiiabl e restriction of 
his right, •; t at res.1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The rights of access, light, and air are easements 
appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they 
constitute property rights forming part of the owner's estate. 
These substantial property rights, although subject to reasonable 
regulation, may not be taken away or unreasonably impaired by the 
State without the payment of just compensation. 
Where, in connection with an actual taking of an abutting 
property owner's property, the erection of a permanent structure 
as a part of a public highway results in the impairment of or 
damage to the abutting property owner's easements of access, 
light, and air, that damage or impairment are relevant factors 
properly considered in determining severance damages. 
^ 
EXHIBIT 49D 
WILLIAM R.LKNG. MAI 
BER3EE \HXJQ 
LAND * 2II.0CP 
.000 
i5mL ^PTCR MUJE * 3 0 0 > 575 
*WXW&t EASEMENT 57£ 
UjviDsCKpiMG- * V T O 
1BTAL AWAKD ^ , 4 1 0 
SUMMARY WW**,* 5 ^ 2 5 
it 
T<5IM- BEFOEtF VjlLUE 00<o N 000 
^ TOTAL A W K R P ^ ^ 
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